



**OWASP**  
Open Web Application  
Security Project



**Christian Folini / @ChrFolini**  
**Introducing the**  
**OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set 3.0**



# Seat Belts

Defense in Depth • 1<sup>st</sup> Line of Defense

# The Plan for Today

- What is a WAF / what is ModSecurity?
- What is the Core Rule Set 3.0 (CRS3)
- Installation (Demo)
- Burp Research Results
- Important Groups of Rules
- Anomaly Scoring / Thresholds
- Paranoia Levels / Stricter Siblings
- Sampling Mode
- Handling of False Positives
- Predefined Rule Exclusions




**CRS**

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# WAF SETUPS

Naïve • Overwhelmed • Functional



# ModSecurity

Embedded • Rule-Oriented • Granular Control

INCLUDES  
DR FOLINI'S  
PARRANOIA MODE



BASED UPON A TRUE STORY!

# CRS3

OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set v3.0

DIRECTED BY  
**CHAIM SANDERS**

STARRING

WALTER HOP AS REGEX WIZARD, CHAIM SANDERS

ORIGINAL IDEA BY OFER SHEZAF AND RYAN BARNETT ALSO STARRING CHRISTIAN FOLINI, FRANZiska BÜHLER, @EMPHAZER, RYAN BARNETT, FELIPE ZIMMERMANN, MANUEL LEOS, VLADIMIR IVANOV, CHRISTIAN PERON, @YGREK, @TOBY78, @JHMUSE, MATT KOCH, ACHIM HOFFMANN, MAZIN AHMED, NOËL ZINDEL



Smart security on demand

COMING SOON TO A SERVER NEAR YOU!



# Installation

SLAC  
BERLIN

## Clone the repository:

```
$> git clone  
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
```

## Copy the example config:

```
$> cp crs-setup.conf.example crs-setup.conf
```

## Include in server config (depending on path):

Include /etc/httpd/modsec.d/owasp-modsecurity-crs/crs-setup.conf


Include /etc/httpd/modsec.d/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/\*.conf



**CRS**


THE 1<sup>ST</sup> LINE OF DEFENSE

# Burp vs. OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set 3.0



Research based on  
4.5M Burp requests.

# Burp vs. OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set 3.0



**CRS3  
Default Install**

Redir.: 0%  
RFI: 0%  
**LFI:** -100%  
**XSS:** -82%  
**SQLi:** -100%

Research based on  
4.5M Burp requests.

# Important Groups of Rules

## Rules Targetting the Request

REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION.conf

REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf

REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf

REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf

REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf

REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf

REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf

REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf

REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf

REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP.conf

REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf

REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQLI.conf

REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESS-FIX.conf

REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf



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# Important Groups of Rules

## Rules Targetting the Response

**RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf**

**RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf**

**RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.conf**

**RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.conf**


**RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.conf**

**RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf**



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
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# Anomaly Scoring

**Adjustable Limit • Blocking Mode • Iterative Tuning**

# Burp vs. OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set 3.0



## CRS3 Default Install

Redir.:	0%
RFI:	0%
LFI:	-100%
XSS:	-82%
SQLi:	-100%

Research based on  
4.5M Burp requests.

# Paranoia Levels



## Paranoia Level 1: Minimal amount of False Positives

*Basic security*



## Paranoia Level 2: More rules, fair amount of FPs

*Elevated security level*

## Paranoia Level 3: Specialised rules, more FPs

*Online banking level security*

## Paranoia Level 4: Insane rules, lots of FPs

*Nuclear power plant level security*

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# Paranoia Levels

## Example: Protocol Enforcement Rules

**Paranoia Level 1:**      **31 rules**

**Paranoia Level 2:**      **7 rules**

**Paranoia Level 3:**      **1 rule**

**Paranoia Level 4:**      **4 rules**



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# Stricter Siblings



## Example: Byte Range Enforcement

### Paranoia Level 1:

Rule 920270: Full ASCII range without null character

### Paranoia Level 2:

Rule 920271: Full visible ASCII range, tab, newline

### Paranoia Level 3:

Rule 920272: Visible lower ASCII range without %

### Paranoia Level 4:

Rule 920273: A-Z a-z 0-9 = - \_ . , : &



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# Sampling Mode



## Limit CRS Impact During Proof of Concept

- Define sampling percentage n
- Only n% of requests are funnelled into CRS3
- 100%-n% of requests are unaffected by CRS3



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# False Positives

False Positives will haunt you from PL2

- Fight FPs with Rule Exclusions
- Follow Tutorials at <https://www.netnea.com>
- Download Cheatsheet from Netnea

## MODSECURITY CHEATSHEET

RULE EXCLUSIONS / TUNING OF FALSE POSITIVES

### RULE EXCLUSIONS

#### ENTIRE RULES

##### STARTUP TIME

WHEN STARTING SERVER   WHEN RELOADING SERVER  
PLACE AFTER CRS INCLUDE

**SecRuleRemoveById**  
**SecRuleRemoveByTag**

*SecRuleRemoveById 942100,...  
SecRuleRemoveByTag "attack-sqli"*

##### RUN TIME

WHEN EXAMINING A REQUEST   PLACE BEFORE CRS INCLUDE

**ctl:ruleRemoveById**  
**ctl:ruleRemoveByTag**

*...,ctl:ruleRemoveById:920300  
...,ctl:ruleRemoveByTag:attack-sqli*

#### PARAMETER IN RULES

##### STARTUP TIME

WHEN STARTING SERVER   WHEN RELOADING SERVER  
PLACE AFTER CRS INCLUDE

**SecRuleUpdateTargetById**  
**SecRuleUpdateTargetByTag**

*SecRuleUpdateTargetById 942100 !ARGS:password  
SecRuleUpdateTargetByTag "attack-sqli" !ARGS:password*

##### RUN TIME

WHEN EXAMINING A REQUEST   PLACE BEFORE CRS INCLUDE

**ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById**  
**ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag**

*...,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById:942100,ARGS:password  
...,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag:attack-sqli,ARGS:password*

# Predefined Rule Exclusions

## Enable Rule Exclusions for Specific Applications

### Currently Supported:

- Wordpress (Default install)
- Drupal (Core)

### In the Queue:

- DokuWiki
- OwnCloud / NextCloud

... contributions welcome!



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# Roundup CRS3

- **1<sup>st</sup> Line of Defense against web attacks**
- **Generic set of blacklisting rules for WAFs**
- **Prevents 80% of web attacks with minimal FPs**
- **Gives you granular control on indiv. Parameters**



More infos at <https://coreruleset.org>

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ModSecurity / CRS Tutorials: <https://www.netnea.com>

ModSecurity / CRS Course: Zurich, September 2018

Contact me at: [christian.folini@netnea.com](mailto:christian.folini@netnea.com)



## MODSECURITY HANDBOOK

The Complete Guide to the Popular  
Open Source Web Application Firewall



Christian Folini  
Ivan Ristić

